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TEAcHER pROFESSIOnALISM AnD TEAM pERFORMAncE 




Sam Houston State University
The purpose of this mixed methods research study was to explore teachers’ perceptions of their professional be-
haviors when they worked in schools that awarded team performance pay. Teachers’ archival responses from 
two questionnaires were analyzed using mixed methods data analysis techniques (Year 1, n = 368; Year 2, n = 
649). Most teachers had positive views of the team performance pay system. Lack of collaboration has been a 
criticism of some individual performance pay systems; however, teachers in this study believed that the team 
performance pay encouraged collaboration and attendance at staff development. Findings were interpreted us-
ing the framework of collective teacher efficacy. Additional studies are needed to explore the potential impact of 
various performance pay systems on professional behaviors of teachers. 
Keywords: performance pay, educational reform, professional behaviors, teachers
Many employees in business and industry have the opportunity to receive merit, bonuses, or performance pay based on the attainment of accomplishing specific criteria or goals (Kanter & Lucas, 2007; Lawler & Mohrman, 2003). Comparatively, few teachers receive performance pay and even fewer receive team per-
formance awards. For example, in 2007-2008, only 14.8% of teachers worked in districts that provided performance 
pay (U.S. Department of Education, 2008). Yet many politicians and business leaders have called for more pay systems 
that reward teacher performance (Podgursky & Springer, 2007b). 
Performance pay plans in the 1980s were based primarily on individual performance and were, for the most part, 
not successful because of teachers’ perceptions of a lack of fairness (Murnane & Cohen, 1986). In order to combat 
these perceptions of a lack of fairness, collaborative or team performance pay programs have been developed. One 
type of team performance pay, school-based performance awards (SBPA), encourages teachers to work together to 
accomplish goals (Odden & Kelly, 2002). Collaborative or team performance pay programs have been developed in 
response to criticisms about individual performance systems (Odden & Kelly, 2002) which have focused on issues 
of fairness, motivation, and communication about the performance pay programs (Kelley, Heneman, & Milanowski, 
2002).  Although teacher collaboration has been suggested as a potential benefit of team performance pay systems, 
empirical studies are needed to understand how teachers perceive the impact of performance pay on their profes-
sional behaviors, particularly team performance pay systems.
Because many business and political leaders, as well as education reformers, have encouraged implementation of 
performance pay programs (Podgursky & Springer, 2007b), research is needed to inform program implementation. 
For this reason, some scholars (Lavy, 2002) have stressed the importance of conducting research related to educa-
tor performance pay, in that “before the introduction of school incentives becomes the next revolution in schools, 
much more concrete evidence is needed about the optimal incentive structure in schools and their effect and cost” 
(p. 1287). Additionally, performance pay programs have potential implementation challenges and financial costs 
that call for research-driven information that supports decision-making related to school performance pay program 
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legislators, and policy makers to understand the impact that performance pay has on teacher professional practices. 
The purpose of this mixed methods research study was to explore teachers’ perceptions of their professional behav-
iors when they worked in schools that awarded team performance pay. Archival data (both quantitative and qualita-
tive) were analyzed from 2 academic years. These questionnaires were completed by 368 teachers during Year 1 of 
implementation and by 649 teachers during Year 2 who were eligible to receive team performance pay. In particular, 
responses to specific questionnaire items that elicited teachers’ perceptions of their professional behaviors in team 
performance pay systems were examined. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: TEAM pERFORMAncE pAY
A review of the literature indicated that there is a continuing debate over the efficacy of using performance pay in 
schools. Although some studies have examined the relationship of performance pay to teacher retention and student 
achievement, few studies were found that examined the issues of teachers’ professional behaviors related to team 
performance pay. 
Those who argue against performance pay for teachers point to its potential to impede teacher collaboration (Hey-
burn, Lewis, & Ritter, 2010). According to Lavy (2007), potential drawbacks or problems associated with performance 
pay and collaboration include the following: (a) measurement problems (i.e., agreement about goals as well as fair 
and accurate evaluations), (b) negative effects on collegiality, (c) unintended consequences (i.e., focus only on mea-
surable dimensions or selected students and game play [cheating]), (d) increased costs, (e) union opposition, and (f ) 
past failures of performance pay systems. Because of these concerns, some researchers have emphasized the possi-
ble benefits of group or team incentive pay structures, rather than individual performance pay, and argue that group 
performance pay can mitigate some of the issues of fairness. However, others have identified several drawbacks as-
sociated with team performance pay. Eberts, Holleneck, and Stone (2002) posited that “team based incentives may 
lead to free riders” (p. 916). Lavy (2007) identified this free riding as a potential problem, especially if a teacher’s reward 
share is small relative to the effort that must be expended. According to Lavy (2007), encouraging peer pressure and 
mutual monitoring can reduce the problem of free riding in a team performance pay program.
Other researchers have focused on the relative merits of team performance pay. Whole school or departmental team 
rewards encouraged goal focus and collaboration (Raham, 2000). According to Mohrman, Mohrman, and Odden 
(1996), group performance pay could be a more successful design when compared to individual rewards. Research-
ers have noted that additional research is necessary to study the impact of group performance pay programs (Perry, 
Engbers, & Jun, 2009; Podgursky & Springer, 2007a; Springer, Ballou et al., 2010; Springer & Gardner, 2010).
When considering how teacher behavior might change related to performance pay, Lavy (2007) posited that teacher 
performance pay could cause teachers to work harder to improve performance. One of the ways that teachers im-
prove performance is through professional development and collaboration. These teacher behaviors are two areas 
of focus of this team performance pay research. For teacher effort to increase through motivation, Kelley (1999) 
suggested that teachers must understand the goals, believe they can accomplish them, and must see the potential 
rewards as valuable. 
cOncEpTUAL FRAMEWORK
The conceptual framework used in this study about team performance pay and teachers’ professional behaviors was 
collective efficacy (Bandura, 2000). Collective teacher efficacy involves the “perceptions of teachers in a school that 
the efforts of the faculty as a whole will have a positive effect on students” (Goddard, Hoy, & Hoy, 2000, p. 480) and 
is based on the earlier work of Bandura’s social cognitive theory. Of particular concern in this study were teachers’ 
perceptions of their professional behaviors in light of the possibility of receiving a team performance bonus based on 
the achievement of their students. The school district described in the context of the study provided a rich environ-
ment to examine perceived behaviors of teachers in specific areas of collaboration, staff development, and support. 
Contextual conditions that provided a rich environment for this study were that these teachers had the opportunity 





































































Mixed methods were used to address the research questions presented in this study. Mixed methods are based on a 
philosophically pragmatic paradigm, a paradigm that best addresses policy-driven topics such as teacher merit pay 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Specifically, a 13-step mixed methods research model developed by Collins, On-
wuegbuzie, and Sutton (2006) was used to guide the methodological process in this study. Overall, the 13-step mixed 
method approach involves a series of steps within stages comprised of formulation (Steps 1-5), planning (Steps 6, 7), 
implementation (Steps 8-11), and writing (Steps 12, 13). Essentially, at each stage in the model, the researcher must 
take steps to identify the purpose for mixing quantitative and qualitative approaches, as well as explicate exactly how 
mixing will occur throughout the research process from sampling to data analysis, validation, and interpretation (see 
Collins, Onwuegbuzie, & Sutton, 2006). This 13-step model was used as a guide in this study because the extensive 
archival survey data included both quantitative and qualitative data as a primary data source and the researchers 
wanted to ensure data were given equal weight throughout the research process.     
context of the Study
The school district in this study was located in an urban/suburban area and had a student enrollment of 106,000 stu-
dents. It was the third largest school district in a state located in the southeastern United States. Because of its neigh-
borhood concept of school placement, the district had great disparity in student demographics, teacher retention, 
and teacher experience levels among its various schools (The Education Trust, 2008). The school district participated 
for 3 years in a grant program called the District Awards for Teacher Excellence (DATE). The DATE was funded by a 
state legislature designed to provide performance pay for teachers based on student performance gains. The objec-
tives of the DATE program included an increase in students’ performance and teacher retention on at-risk campuses 
in the district. Secondly, school district administrators hoped that the team structure of the award would motivate 
teachers to collaborate to improve student performance. The teachers who responded to this survey were eligible for 
varying amounts of reward based on the courses and grade levels they taught. Those teachers who taught a course 
and grade level that was tested in the state accountability examination could earn a reward of between $3,500 and 
$5,500. Those teachers who did not teach a state-tested content and grade level were eligible for awards between 
$750 and $1,000.   
Selection of participants
Archival survey data were taken from a nested sample of a larger data set collected by the National Center on Per-
formance Incentives at Vanderbilt University. The data used in this study included responses from all teachers in one 
school district that implemented performance pay for two academic years, 2008-2009 and 2009-2010. All teach-
ers surveyed worked in schools that were Title I campuses with high percentages of students living in poverty. For 
2008-2009, data from teachers at 13 elementary schools and six middle schools were used. For 2009-2010, teacher 
response data were used from 14 elementary schools and seven middle schools. Only the responses from teachers 
were used in our study and included 368 teachers for 2008-2009 and 649 teachers for 2009-2010. Some of the same 
teachers participated in the data collection from both years; however, we were not given permission to identify par-
ticipants in order to compare individual responses.  
Instruments
The two questionnaires used in the study originally were developed by research staff at the National Center on Per-
formance Incentives to measure educators’ attitudes about the DATE or team performance pay program, the school 
environment, and teachers’ professional practices (Springer, Lewis, Ehlert et al., 2010). The instruments were admin-
istered online to all full time instructional staff members at all of the team performance pay program schools. The 
questionnaire had 55 items in the spring 2009 administration and 63 items in the spring 2010 administration. These 
items were divided into the following sections: (a) professional title, (b) attitudes about the program, (c) school en-
vironment, (d) curriculum and instruction practices, (e) background information, and (f ) teacher compensation in-
formation. The attitudinal questions related to the DATE program and the school environments were designed with 
four structured-anchored response choices. Questions related to curriculum and instruction were focused on time 
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ended responses on the two archival instruments that provided qualitative data; in this study these data were com-
pared with the quantitative data.  
Data Analysis
The archival data were analyzed using a mixed methods data analysis approach. Specifically, findings were integrated 
from both quantitative data analysis and qualitative analysis techniques (Onwuegbuzie & Combs, 2010) that involved 
descriptive statistics, a constant comparative approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) to analyze narrative responses, and 
the use of a matrix to identify similarities and differences across data. Descriptive statistics, including frequencies, 
were used to analyze closed-item responses. All open-ended responses were reviewed and coded by three different 
researchers, with particular attention to comments that reflected the notion of collective efficacy (Bandura, 2000). 
Codes were tallied to generate several themes that captured teachers’ perceptions of their professional behaviors as 
they related to the participation in the team performance pay system. After collapsing and re-categorizing themes 
and checking for unusual cases, findings from the quantitative and qualitative analyses then were combined on a 
matrix to identify the most prominent emergent themes related to teachers’ professional behaviors. In comparing 
quantitative and qualitative findings, four primary themes emerged, all of which reflected teachers’ favorable views 
of the performance pay system.      
FInDInGS 
The findings of this research indicated that most teachers had positive perceptions of the DATE team performance 
pay program. Overall, teachers perceptions, as interpreted from qualitative and quantitative data, reflected their be-
liefs that the program (a) was worthwhile and generally accepted and supported by teachers, (b) helped them to 
improve their teaching practices in ways that might have improved student learning, (c) contributed to high quality 
professional development, and (d) positively impacted collaboration and collegiality.  
General Acceptance and Support by Teachers
A key component of professionalism related to the general acceptance and support for the DATE program. The quan-
titative and qualitative findings suggested strong support from teachers for implementation, with 90.9% in Year 1 
and 90.6% in Year 2 agreeing with the statement, “I am glad that the school is participating in the DATE program 
this 2008-2009 school year.” Agreement was 70.4% to the item, “The DATE incentive plan at my school is helping to 
increase student learning” in the first year of implementation and 73.7% in the second year of implementation. A 
strong majority in Year 1 (72.6%) agreed with the statement, “The DATE incentive plan is helping to improve teaching 
practices at my school.” Likewise, in Year 2 of implementation, 71.6% agreed with the same statement.   
Qualitative results were also positive. In Year 1, a teacher stated, “I appreciate being recognized for doing a great job 
with my kiddos. THANKS.” Supportive comments were stated in a variety of ways, including “Love the DATE program 
and hope it continues!” An additional teacher expressed that the program was a “good incentive for teachers.” A 
teacher entreated, “Please keep this program at our school.” Yet another teacher expressed, “This has been a wonder-
ful opportunity to participate in DATE Grant.” One enthusiastic teacher wrote, “Yea for DATE grant!!! Any extra money 
is very much appreciated.” Another teacher expressed the same sentiment:
I do not feel the DATE grant changed me as a teacher because I am there for the kids not the money. With 
that being said, I do appreciate the money being given to the teachers of hard to fill positions in schools that 
are hard to keep staff. We work extremely hard on a daily basis to get our students to perform at a level of 
students who do not have to deal with the issues outside of school that our students do. It is nice to be com-
pensated for the difficult job we do every day.
A few comments expressed an anticipation that some of their colleagues might respond negatively to the program 
because those teachers did not teach a course and grade level that could receive a maximum reward. The following 
teacher’s comment was reflective of that position:
I think this is a good program. I feel that some teachers are resentful, but they do not even attempt to teach 
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recognition for our efforts with the students.
Support for the idea that teachers on at-risk campuses would be provided this benefit was reflected in the following 
statement:
I like the idea of rewarding teachers in a school that deals with a difficult group of students. We deal with daily 
issues that many other teachers in other schools don’t so it is great that we are trying to keep highly qualified 
teachers on our campus.
Improvement of Teaching practices
The DATE program teachers generally indicated that participation in the program helped them improve their teach-
ing practice because they felt motivated to do so. This was particularly evident in data collected during the second 
year of program implementation when teachers appeared to express greater overall support for the program and 
recognition that the DATE program provided incentives for teachers.
Several teachers indicated that they were working harder as a result of the DATE program. One teacher explained, “I 
believe the DATE program has helped increase the teachers [sic] performance and has increased student learning. 
TAKS-tested grades have truly kicked up their teaching practices.” Another teacher wrote a similar comment, “I think 
this program encouraged me to be a better teacher because there was something in it for me. It rewarded hard work.” 
There were several comments specifically describing the motivational aspects of the DATE program. One teacher ex-
pressed, “The program motivates me to be a better teacher and professional.” Another teacher noted, “The DATE pro-
gram is a motivating incentive for educators.” Although some teachers seemed hesitant to admit that the program’s 
reward was motivating, they still expressed support for the program. One teacher explained:
I feel that I have been working hard along with my students on their progress and would have been even if 
there wasn’t a DATE grant. However, I do see other people putting more effort and helping others to help in 
motivating students [sic] performance. Its [sic] nice to be rewarded for our hard work.  
Another teacher expressed, “I feel that the DATE grant program is great. This really motivates all the staff in the school 
to get all students to perform at a higher level. This program has really united all of us.”  
These narrative comments by teachers support the quantitative results indicating that teachers believed that the 
program motivated them to improve their teaching skills and strategies. In the first year of implementation, a major-
ity (52.3%) expressed agreement with the statement, “I will change my professional practices to try and earn a DATE 
bonus award.” In the second year, the results were slightly higher, with 55.4% expressing agreement with the same 
statement. For the 2008-2009 survey, a strong majority (72.6%) supported the statement, “The DATE incentive plan 
is helping to improve teaching practices at my school.” In the second year of implementation, agreement with that 
statement was less, but still reflected a strong majority, with 68.6% expressing agreement that the DATE program was 
improving teaching practices. Both quantitative and qualitative results reflected strong support for the belief that the 
DATE program improved teaching practices in these at-risk schools.
Quality of professional Development
Staff development is an important function of professionalism for educators. In both Years 1 and 2, for the category 
of staff development, the qualitative and quantitative data were positive. For the question, “The DATE incentive plan 
at my school is contributing to improvements in the quality of professional development offered to teachers,” 68.2% 
expressed agreement in 2009 and 64.9% in 2010. When asked to compare the amount of time spent on profes-
sional development activities compared to the prior school year, almost one half (48.8%) responded they spent more 
time “attending district-or school-sponsored professional development workshops.” A similar percentage (48.6%) of 
teachers responded that they were spending more time on staff development activities than last year by “engag-
ing in informal self-directed learning” (e.g., reading subject-specific education research, using the Internet to enrich 
knowledge and skills).
When analyzing the open-ended statements, there were multiple comments coded into the category of staff devel-
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development component of the DATE program. One teacher articulated it this way:
I have had the opportunity to attend many workshops that have provided such wonderful information this 
year. This is my first year to teach special education and these classes have proven to be what I needed to gain 
new information. I have 18 years experience in the classroom and feel like this year has been the most fulfill-
ing for me because of the great learning opportunities that the DATE grant has provided. 
Another teacher shared, “I have seen an increase in staff development attendance due to the DATE grant.” A similar 
perception was expressed in this response, “I have been very pleased with the professional development opportu-
nities with the DATE Grant. I feel that I have learned good information to use to impact my students.” Yet another 
teacher commented on the collaborative nature of the staff development by saying, “I liked how the DATE grant staff 
development brought schools of like demographics together so that discussions were relevant for our students.” 
However, the qualitative data also revealed some negative perspectives about the staff development associated with 
the DATE program, especially the number and timing of workshop offerings. One teacher said, “The on-campus DATE 
classes have been infrequent and unorganized. They are held on days when teachers need to hold tutorials. The 
classes are not helpful.” Another teacher related, “Much more professional development should be offered for math 
instruction to teachers who need to reach struggling students.” One teacher shared a similar perspective, saying, “I 
feel there was only one chance offered for certain workshops. Sometimes there was a conflict I could not change. I 
missed out on the training.” A concern was also expressed about how teachers received credit and compensation for 
attending training:
Something needs to be changed about how credit is given for the online course work. Many teachers...did not 
get credit for doing the work. It was very discouraging to have put forth the time and effort and not receive 
credit for it.
Although there was some criticism of the staff development offerings associated with the DATE program, the major-
ity of the open-ended teacher comments were positive and indicated perceptions of improvements in professional 
development offerings as a result of the program.
positive Impact on collaboration and collegiality
Results from this research indicated that DATE team performance pay program participants believed that the pro-
gram fostered collegiality and cooperation among teachers. The collaboration category was important for this re-
search because this DATE grant was designed intentionally as a team performance pay program. Additionally, some 
researchers have identified team performance pay as a method of reducing some of the concerns about collegiality 
and cooperation related to performance pay (Lavy, 2007).  
Quantitative data reflected a strong perception by teachers of increased collaboration the first year of implementa-
tion, especially when asked to compare perceptions to the previous year. For the first year, there were several items 
on the teacher survey that related to collaboration. When asked to identify how important each factor was in de-
termining a teacher’s eligibility for a DATE bonus award, collaboration with faculty and staff was the third most im-
portant (57.8%) after improvements in test scores (69.3%) and teaching in hard-to-staff schools (58.4%). Only 23.9% 
agreed with the statement “The DATE incentive plan is causing resentment among teachers at my school.” When 
asked the question in a different manner, a similar response was given by teachers. There were 77.6% of the teachers 
who disagreed with the statement that “The DATE incentive plan is having a negative impact on the school culture 
and professional collegiality in my school.” 
Additional questions related to a comparison from the first year of implementation (2008-2009) to the school year 
prior to implementation (2007-2008) had similar strong results. When asked if teachers “seem more competitive than 
cooperative,” 84.4% disagreed. Likewise, 87.3% disagreed with the statement that teachers “trust each other less.” A 
substantial majority, or 73.9%, said that compared to last school year, teachers “feel more responsible to help each 
other do their best.” Similarly, 65.7% indicated that compared to the last school year, teachers “can be counted on 
more often to help out anywhere or anytime, even though it may not be part of their official assignment.” When asked 
to compare specifically how they had changed their own teaching practices in the first year of implementation (i.e., 
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student test results with other teachers,” and a slight majority (53.8%) said that they were “seeking help from/provid-
ing help to other teachers informally” more than they had the previous year. 
Although few open-ended responses related to the category of collaboration in the first year, those comments that 
were analyzed were all positive about the effects of the DATE program. One teacher responded, “I learned from the 
online module discussions [and] questions and got ideas from other teacher responses.”  Another teacher mentioned 
the importance of teachers understanding the impact that collaboration would have on receiving a reward by say-
ing, “They [administration] need to emphasize that this is an incentive for us all to work together to improve student 
performance (especially in TAKS-tested areas), so if they can help us out, it will benefit them financially.” One teacher 
explained how the DATE program encouraged collaboration through interdisciplinary and cross-content instruction:
The DATE program allowed us to integrate more subject areas. As teams we were able to meet and discuss 
what each subject was doing and help each other reinforce concepts taught in the subjects. It helped us to 
come together and help us teach our students that subjects intersect. At first the students didn’t understand 
why were [sic] were discussing science in a reading class or world culture events, and now they see how all 
the subjects interconnect with each other.  
Another teacher described the benefits of working collaboratively in evaluating data:  
It has been a learning experience especially when our team did the data dig. Coming together and seeing 
the areas that students were strong and weak.... Also, we tried focusing more on those weak areas when we 
taught and the test questions we asked.  
For the second year of the survey (2010), quantitative and qualitative data continued to reflect support for the impact 
the team performance pay program had on collaboration and collegiality. When considering the quantitative survey 
data, there was a slight increase in positive responses to the question, “The DATE incentive plan is causing resent-
ment among teachers at my school.” There was a 33.8% agreement, which was an increase of 10.2% from the prior 
year. These data still reflected that the majority did not believe the DATE program was causing resentment. Teachers 
disagreed strongly (81.1%) that teachers “seem more competitive than cooperative.” Similarly, 86.2% disagreed with 
the statement that teachers “trust each other less.” Another strong majority of teachers (76.5%) responded that they 
“feel more responsible to help each other do their best.”  When asked, “Can teachers be counted on more often to 
help out anywhere or anytime, even though it may not be part of their official assignment?” 70.1% agreed. When 
asked to identify how they had changed their teaching practices this year (2009-2010) from the last year (2008-2009), 
one half of the teachers (50.8%) indicated they were more often “seeking help from/providing help to other teachers 
informally.” Based on the numerous quantitative responses, the teachers perceived that the DATE team performance 
pay program was related to increased collegiality. 
Additionally, there were several open-ended comments related to collaboration on the spring 2010 survey. One 
teacher expressed, “I feel that the DATE grant program is great. This really motivates all the staff in the school to get 
all students to perform at a higher level. This program has really united all of us.” 
In the second year, some teacher respondents expressed a preference for individual rewards rather than a group re-
ward. As one teacher expressed,
Our DATE program was based solely on the team. However, my individual performance for both my classes far 
surpasses others and yet I never get any money. I cannot control the interest, and commitment of others, only 
myself. I have consistently reached my goals, but because my team does not, there is no monitary [sic] gain 
for me. Although I am not in it for the monitary [sic] gain, it is frustrating to see others get it.... Like a chain, the 
team is only as strong as its weakest link. We as teachers are not the ones who hire others, nor can we impose 
and instill our values and beliefs on others who have no desire to change.
Another teacher concurred with this comment:   
It would be better to evaluate eligibility for awards based on individual teacher performance rather than as a 
grade level. Last year we had a teacher who was moving schools so she made no secret of not caring and not 
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In conclusion, the preponderance of quantitative and qualitative responses from teachers to questions related to col-
laboration for both years of the survey indicated that teachers perceived the DATE team performance pay program 
was related to increased collegiality.
DIScUSSIOn
Some researchers have reported the potential for negative effects on teacher professional behaviors, collegiality, and 
teacher collaboration as a result of performance pay programs (e.g., Adams, Heywood, & Rothstein, 2009; Eberts, Hol-
lenbeck, & Stone, 2009). However, the results of our study reflected a positive perception of teacher behaviors and 
teacher collegiality by the teachers surveyed. The qualitative responses further suggested that the team design of 
this performance pay program could have been a factor in these positive results.   
Additionally, the results of this study have implications for the development and implementation of other perfor-
mance incentive programs as they relate to teacher professionalism. Based on the findings discussed in the previous 
section, performance incentive programs such as DATE might motivate teachers to improve their teaching; however, 
teacher motivation has been found to be influenced by numerous other factors that do not necessarily involve finan-
cial incentives (Kelley, Heneman, & Milanowski, 2002).
In this study, there was evidence that professional development quality and opportunities were enhanced as a result 
of the existence of the DATE program. Typically, performance incentive programs provide stipulations for profes-
sional development that goes beyond the staff in-service opportunities typically offered to teachers. Additionally, 
funds provided by the program can make professional development more viable. In considering implementation of 
future performance programs, district leaders should more closely consider the needs of individual school sites, as 
well as design effective ways for teachers to obtain credit and recognition for completing professional development. 
In particular, in this study some teachers expressed concern about obtaining credit for staff development offered 
on-line. On-line professional development requires careful planning and design to address both technological and 
content challenges.
The increased collaboration and cooperation among teachers in the DATE program was a surprising, yet important 
finding in this study. Although teacher retention was the primary goal of the DATE program, collaboration emerged 
as a key outcome reported by teacher respondents. Literature on professional learning communities and teacher 
collaboration suggests that teacher collaboration can positively impact student achievement (Goddard, Goddard, & 
Tschannen-Moran, 2007; McLaughlin, 2006) because teachers’ skills and ideas are shared and, therefore, enhanced 
for the betterment of students. Teacher collegiality, engagement, and learning are also enhanced in the collaborative 
process (McLaughlin, 2006). Based on the findings of this study, districts that decide to implement teacher incentive 
programs should focus on team models rather than individual models.
cOncLUSIOn
Our research indicated a positive teacher perception of the team performance pay program. Teachers reported in 
both the quantitative and qualitative data that they supported the program and believed it was related to increased 
student learning at their schools. The data reflected that the program helped to improve the quality and participation 
in staff development. Additionally, a strong majority of the teachers indicated the team performance pay program 
resulted in enhanced teacher collaboration and collegiality.   
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